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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Due Process-Ohio Clarifies
Position On Judicial Impartiality
State ex rel. Brockman v. Proctor,298 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio 1973).
Charles Brockman was charged with certain traffic violations in the chartered city of Blue Ash, Ohio and ordered to appear before the mayor's
court. The city of Blue Ash had a council-city manager form of local government. The mayor presided at all meetings of the city council and voted
on all matters, including those concerning the budget. He also served as
judge in the mayor's court, having jurisdiction to hear and determine cases
involving violations of municipal ordinances and criminal cases involving
traffic violations. Brockman objected to the jurisdiction of the mayor's
court and contended that he was being denied a trial before a disinterested
and impartial judge, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The mayor's court overruled his objection. Subsequently, Brockman sought relief by a writ of prohibition in the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Held-Writ denied. To compel a defendant to stand trial
before a mayor who has no executive authority but who is a voting member
of the city council which determines appropriations and expenditures of
revenue derived from fines and forfeitures does not constitute a denial
of due process.'
2
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process,"
which can be satisfied only by the existence of a truly impartial judiciary.
At common law in England, the idea that "no man ought to be a judge in
his own cause" was rigidly applied as one means to guarantee impartiality
to an accused. The most celebrated example of this doctrine can be found
in Rex v. Great Charte4 where the conviction of a pauper in a two-judge
court was later voided because one of the justices was a resident of the
parish from which the pauper came.5 This theory was also followed in the
United States in Pearce v. Atwood," where the Supreme Court of Massachu1. State ex rel. Brockman v. Proctor, 298 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio 1973).
2. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). In Murchison, a Michigan state
judge had served as a "one-man" grand jury and later adjudged two witnesses guilty
of contempt, after a court hearing, for events which had occurred before his grand

jury.
3. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610). As translated from the
Latin: [N]on debet esse Judex in propia causa ....
4. 93 Eng. Rep. 1107 (K.B. 1792).
5. The one justice was held to be an interested party because as a resident he
was subject to pay the poor's rate (some form of welfare). Rex v. Great Charte, 93
Eng. Rep. 1107 (K.B. 1792).
6. 13 Mass. 324 (1816).
The doctrine was narrowed by Ohio in Thomas v.
Town of Mt. Vernon, 9 Ohio 291 (1839), where the mayor was held to have jurisdic-

tion to determine the validity of an ordinance, even though a citizen.
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setts held that a judge should be disqualified where he was an inhabitant
of the town which would receive part of the fine if the accused were con7
victed.
In an attempt to minimize the opportunities from which conflicts of interest arise when the government is involved in litigation, the United States
Constitution established the separation of powers and duties among the
three branches of government. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain or establish." This separation has been carried over into state governments, 9 but not, apparently, to many municipal governments. 10
The judiciary on a local level is provided for by state statutes." The
power to form a governing body, however, is given to municipalities in most
state constitutions through a "home rule" provision.' 2 A home rule city
has the statutory right to exercise all powers incident to the enjoyment of
local self-government not prohibited by the constitution or laws of the state."3
In most jurisdictions the constitutional provisions for home rule clearly
demonstrate that state law must provide the foundation from which municipal government arises. 14 The Ohio Constitution Home Rule Provision,
which was involved in the instant case, grants significant freedom to the municipalities:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local selfgovernment and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local
police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict
with general laws. 15
This provision is unique for two reasons. First, a municipality's home
rule powers are self-executing.

State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner'6 pointed out

7. Id. at 341. The justice of the peace could not preside in the suit because onehalf of the fine, if the accused were convicted, would go to the town of his residence.
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9. See, e.g., MAINE CONsT. art. III, § 1; MASS. CONST.,

§ 31 art. XXX, at 76;
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1, art. IV, § 1, and art. VI, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. II, § 2.
10. See, e.g., Sarlls v. State, 166 N.E. 270 (Ind. 1929); Dieruf v. Louisville & Jef-

ferson County Bd. of Health, 200 S.W.2d 300 (Ky. 1947); State v. Truder, 289 P. 594
(N.M. 1930); Eggers v. Kenny, 104 A.2d 10 (N.J. 1954); Gaud v. Walker, 53 S.E.2d
316 (S.C. 1949).
11. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1001 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAws ch.
222, § 1 (1955); N.Y. UNIFORM JUSTICE CT. ACT, art. 2, § 201

(McKinney Supp.

1973); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2385 (1963), art. 2386 (Supp. 1974), and art.
2387 (1963).
12. See, e.g., ARZ. CONsT. art. XIII, §§ 2-3; MASS.

CONST.,

§ 235 art. LXXXIX,

at 264; Mo. CONST. art. VI, §§ 19-20; N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. II,
§ 5.
13. 1 E. YOKLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 57, at 74, 75 (Supp. 1973) and §
58, at 112 (1956).
14. Blume, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio: The New Look, 11 W. RES. L. REV.
538 (1960).
15. OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
16. 164 N.E.2d 574 (Ohio 1960).
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that a chartered municipality had power to enact and enforce ordinances
relating to home rule powers, regardless of procedural state law on the subject; but, a non-chartered city does not have this same authority. 1" Second,
the powers considered to be matters of local self-government are beyond
state legislative interference. As late as 1964, the Ohio Supreme Court applied in Leavers v. City of Canton1 s the rule that an ordinance passed by
a "chartered" city concerning local government was valid, although in clear
variance with the state law.' 9
By allowing such freedom in local government, the duties and powers of
the public officers in Ohio's chartered cities remain under the control of the
local community. Ohio's state statutes serve as guidelines for local municipalities and need be rigidly followed only by non-charter cities.2 0 According to the state statutes, the mayor shall be the executive head of the community and chief conservator of the peace, and shall have the powers and
duties provided by law.2 ' One statutory duty provided for is that of presiding over the mayor's court:
In all municipal corporations not having a police court and not being
the site of a municipal court . . ., the mayor of such municipal corporation has jurisdiction to hear and determine any prosecution for the
violation of an ordinance of the municipal corporation, and has jurisdiction in all criminal causes involving moving traffic violations occurring on state highways located within the boundaries of the municipal
22
corporation ....
Ohio courts have seen much litigation concerning the ability of one individual to be totally impartial when serving as both mayor and judge. The
possible existence of a conflict of interest resulting from the mayor's assumption of judicial functions was first presented in Tumey v. Ohio.23 Here the
17. Id. at 578; accord, Morris v. Roseman, 123 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio 1954). See
also Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 140 N.E. 595 (Ohio 1923).
18. 203 N.E.2d 354 (Ohio 1964). In applying the rule the Ohio Supreme Court
held that an ordinance passed by non-charter city, providing that city fire department
employees must retire at age 65, was at variance with a state statute and thus invalid.
Id. at 356.
19. Id. at 356. See Bindas v. Andrish, 136 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 1956); State ex rel.
Arey v. Shirell, 53 N.E.2d 501 (Ohio 1944); City of Mansfield v. Endly, 176 N.E.
462 (Ohio Ct. App.), a! 'd, 181 N.E. 886 (Ohio 1931); Froelich v. City of Cleveland,
124 N.E. 212 (Ohio 1919); State ex rel. City of Toledo v. Lynch, 102 N.E. 670 (Ohio
1913).
20. State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner, 164 N.E.2d 574 (Ohio 1960).
21. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 24 (Page Supp. 1973) and §§ 23, 30, 32, and 40 (Page
1954). These statutes provide that the executive power of the village shall be vested
in a mayor elected for 4 years who shall be chief conservator of the peace, shall not
vote except in cases of a tie and shall have the powers and duties as provided by the
general law and by the bylaws and ordinances of the municipal corporation. He
is also required to communicate to the legislature a statement of finances, and all fines
collected by him shall be paid into the treasury.
22. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1905.01 (Page 1968).
23. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 5 [2022], No. 4, Art. 12

19741

CASE NOTES

mayor served as judge in the mayor's court and was paid compensation for
such services only from the fines he collected in his judicial capacity. Additionally, the revenue from this court added materially to the financial
prosperity of the municipality, for which the mayor, as head of the local
government, was responsible. 24 The United States Supreme Court reasoned
that a financial interest of the court in its decision constituted an unfair
and partial tribunal within the prohibition of the 14th amendment. The
Court further stated that the slightest pecuniary interest of any officer,
judicial or quasi-judicial, in the subject matter which he was to decide, rendered the decision voidable. 25 Here, the Court noted that the test for impartiality was whether the dual function of mayor and judge is one
which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge
to forget the burden of proof required to convict a defendant, or which
might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the
State and the accused .... 26
Unlike the mayor in Tumey, in Dugan v. Ohio27 the mayor served in a judicial capacity, but his salary was not dependent upon the revenue received
from convictions. He was a member of a commission form of government
with a city manager performing the executive functions. The Court held
that the mayor's interest in the financial policy of the city was too remote
to be influential in his judicial decision-making capacity. In following Tumey, the Court's finding of "no pecuniary interest" was the primary basis
for the determination that the accused had not been denied due process. 28
The scope of the Tumey decision as it related to a possible conflict of
interest resulting from a mayor's assumption of judicial duties was broadened by the Supreme Court in Ward v. Village of Monroeville.29 The
Court stated that a possible temptation of partiality and denial of due process to an accused could exist where the mayor exercised wide executive authority in the community. s0 The mayor in his executive capacity as head
of the village was responsible for its financial policy, with the mayor's court
providing up to 50 percent of the village's revenue. The Court pointed
out that the mayor's executive responsibilities for a city's financial condition could make him partisan to maintaining a high amount of contribution
from the mayor's court. 8'
24. Id. at 520.
25. Id. at 524.
26. Id. at 532.
27. 277 U.S. 61 (1928).
28. Id. at 65.
29. 409 U.S. 57 (1972). When heard in the Ohio Supreme Court, 271 N.E.2d 757
(1971), Justice Corrigan dissented. His dissent was upheld by the United States Supreme Court when they reversed the Ohio decision in 409 U.S. 57 (1972). Justice
Corrigan has also dissented in the instant case (Brockman).
30. Id. at 62.

31. Id. at 61.
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Some jurisdictions have attempted to achieve judicial impartiality by applying the theory of incompatibility of offices.3 2 Such incompatibility exists
where a duty in one office is subordinate to a duty in another, where there
is a conflict in the two offices, or where the duties and functions of the offices are inherently inconsistent and repugnant .3
An instance of incompatibility was found by the Supreme Court of Maine in Lesieur v. Lausier"4
where an individual holding the office of municipal judge was elected mayor.
The office of mayor was found to be incompatible with the office of municipal court judge with the court pointing out that there could be conflicting interests where the mayor, as chief conservator of the peace, would
have the duty to require that certain classes of cases be prosecuted in the
municipal court, where he would, as judge, hear and determine these same
complaints.8 5 In Michigan, this type of conflicting interest has been eliminated by an express constitutional provision which prohibits a judge from
serving in any other elective position during his tenure in office.3 6 By requiring this additional safeguard, it would seem that the defendant's right
to a fair and impartial trial would be greatly enhanced.
Although an individual was serving as both mayor and judge in the instant
case, the court held there was no conflict of interest. In arriving at its decision, the court found that the direct pecuniary interest of a mayor in his
judicial position, as in Tumey, or the creation of a mayor's office with wide
executive responsibility for the financial condition of the community, as in
Ward, were not present here. The majority instead paralleled the facts in
Brockman to those in Dugan and stated that the mayor's relation to the
financial policy of the municipality was too remote to warrant a presumption of bias.37 As in Dugan, the mayor in Brockman was not the executive
head of a city; a city manager was designated the chief executive and
administrative officer of the city. The mayor, however, was a member of the
city council, presiding over all meetings, besides performing his judicial duties. 38 And even though the mayor's court in Brockman contributed at least
32. See, e.g., People v. Rapsy, 107 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1940) (city judge and city attorney offices held incompatible); Reilly v. Ozzard, 166 A.2d 360 (N.J. 1960) (office
of senator and township attorney incompatible); People v. Capuano, 327 N.Y.S.2d 17
(Monroe County Ct. 1971) (judge as member of town board held incompatible); cf.
Wilson v. Iowa City, 165 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1969) (a councilman owning stock in
corporation involved in Urban Renewal project was an interested party and his vote
on an Urban Renewal resolution was void).
33. Poynter v. Walling, 177 A.2d 641, 644 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965). Although the
court was aware of this test, it liberally applied the principle and found that the offices of mayor and justice of the peace were not incompatible. Id. at 644.
34. 96 A.2d 585 (Me. 1953). See also Howard v. Harrington, 96 A. 769 (Me.
1916) (mayor and police court judge held incompatible).
35. Lesieur v. Lausier, 96 A.2d 585, 587 (Me. 1953).
36. MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 21.
37. 298 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ohio 1973).
38. BLuE ASH, OHIo, ORDINANCES art. IV, § 4.01, and art. V, § 5.02 (1961). The
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10 percent to the city's revenue with the mayor voting on all revenue appropriations, 89 the court emphasized that the mayor actually had "only the
legislative power that a single member of a municipal council or commission holds, '' 40 Therefore, the trial at which the mayor determined the guilt
41
or innocence of the defendant did not violate the requisites of due process.
Justice Corrigan, however, in a strong dissent, argued that the mayor's
impartiality can be affected where monies collected from fines and costs
levied by the mayor in his court are paid into the general operating funds
of the city, and that fact alone should be sufficient to disqualify him as a
judicial officer. 42 It is clear that the outcome of any case heard in the
mayor's court would affect the financial affairs of the city; thus the test
should not be whether this is 50 percent as in Ward43 or 10 percent as in
the instant case; 44 the test should be the very existence vel non of a financial
connection. "[O]ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent even
the probability of unfairness, '41 so if there should exist the slightest possibility of bias or prejudice in anyone's eyes, the judicial procedure should be
changed.
Although the doctrine of separation of powers has not been incorporated
into most municipal governments, the United States Supreme Court has described the city as a miniature state with the council as its legislature and
the charter as its constitution. 46 It would appear then that this description
would necessarily include an independent judiciary and the argument that
it is "common" to vest the mayor with judicial authority would not sufficiently outweigh the desirability of separation of powers at the local level.
Other states have managed to vest the judicial duties held by the mayor in
Ohio in other public officers, such as the justice of the peace, 47 or the municipal 48 or police court 49 judge, in order to minimize the problem of conflicting interests. This is not to imply that those serving the dual functions
of mayor and judge are not persons of the highest integrity, exhibiting the
greatest self-sacrifice, or that they can not carry on their functions without
council chooses the mayor by majority vote from among their number. The City Manager is also appointed by the council.
39. State ex rel. Brockman v. Proctor, 298 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ohio 1973).

40. Id. at 536 (court's emphasis).
41. Id. at 536.
42. Id. at 536-537. Justice Corrigan dissented in Ward v. Village of Monroeville,

271 N.E.2d 757 (Ohio 1971) for much the same reason.
43. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 58 (1972).
44. State ex rel. Brockman v. Proctor, 298 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ohio 1973).
45. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
46. Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 38 (1893). See also 1 E. YOKLEY, MUNiCEPAL CORPORATIONS § 38, at 77 (1956).
47. See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. VI, §§ 1, 5; CONN. CONST. art. 5, § 2; FLA. CONST.
art. 5, § 11.
48. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:8-1 (Supp. 1973).
49. N.Y. Vi.LAGE LAws § 4-410 (McKinney 1973).
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danger of injustice,50 but it does mean that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." 51 The defendant should feel confident, in the first instance, that he is receiving a fair trial before a fair and impartial judge.
[I]t is important in the administration of justice not only that our courts
be presided over by judges who are fair and impartial, but

. .

.

equally

important that litigants believe that they are being tried by a judge
who is fair5 2and impartial and not influenced by any personal interest
in the case.

Virginia M. Jordan
50. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).

51. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).

52. People v. McDonald, 167 N.Y.S.2d 394, 396 (Columbia County Ct. 1957). See
also Van Schaick v. Carr, 289 N.Y.S. 495, 502 (1936); People v. Rowley, 264 N.Y.S.2d
42, 43 (Fulton County Ct. 1965).
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